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Abstract Design plays an integral role in the func-
tions of modern society. Yet the abstract process by 
which designers carry out their work is not obvious. 
The study of design thinking has grown in recent 
years into a major area of academic research, yet 
it presently lacks a clear theoretical basis; and as a 
discipline, its methodologies are disparate. Here, we 
outline and clarify the framework of the scholarly 
study of design thinking, introducing the major ideas 
and concepts upon which the field is based. We then 
discuss in detail the various methodological issues of 
the field, and argue that, in its current state, the field 
of design thinking cannot sustain itself as an inde-
pendent area of academic research. We suggest that 
design thinking may best be studied from a sociolog-
ical or science, technology, and society (STS) studies 
perspective. 
Keywords Design Thinking; ambiguity; cognitive 
science; justification; explanation
Dimensions of Design
Virtually all aspects of our daily lives are, in some 
form or another, designed. Everything from the alarm 
clock that wakes us up in the morning, to the public 
transit network that takes us to work, to the home 
we return to in the evening is a product of design. But 
how does a designer determine how to design such 
products? This is the role of design thinking. In order 
to grasp what design thinking is, it is important to 
understand the various objects, actors, and processes 
that come into play in the process of design. First 
of all, the actual activity of design is notably not an 
academic activity; the actors who engage in design 
practices are not academics, but rather, they are in-
dustry professionals. Designers are the people who 
work within particular sectors of the working world 
to create solutions to specific problems that are often 
unique to their sectors. For instance, in the corporate 
world designers may help to develop new workflow 
procedures, managerial techniques, and so forth to 
help increase the efficiency and efficacy of a working 
group. Fields such as architecture and urban design 
are largely populated by designers, who apply them-
selves to finding novel solutions to problems related to 
how the members of the public experience the spaces 
they live in, and many areas of the arts, such as the-
atre and fashion, are intimately connected to design.
Importantly, as actors in the world, designers 
report to another category of actors, namely the 
consumer. Often, the consumer fills the role of the 
problem creator, whereas the designer acts as the 
problem solver. Consumers include the people who 
hire the designers for particular projects, as well as 
those who are affected by the realization of the design-
er’s work. For example, if a manager of a senior corpo-
ration hires a designer to improve the workflow pro-
cess of their company, then both the manager and the 
employees are consumers of the designer’s products. 
Thus, the category of consumers includes not only 
those that engage in some kind of an exchange with 
designers, but it also includes those that are impacted, 
either directly or indirectly, by the work of designers. 
In short, the category of consumers can include those 
that create problems requiring design solutions, those 
that hire and interact directly with the designers, 
and those that are affected by designers’ work. No 
doubt, an individual may belong to a number of these 
sub-categories.
In solving a problem, a designer produces a 
product, be it a building design, a material consumer 
product, a costume for a theatrical production, and 
so forth, which is then consumed for its intended 
purpose. One labels the process by which a designer 
arrives at the solution to some particular problem 
“design thinking” or “designerly thinking” (some au-
thors have provided more nuanced accounts of these 
terms and their differences; here we take them to be 
identical). The final layer of this system, then, is the 
scholar or academic who seeks to understand the pro-
cesses underlying design thinking. These scholars treat 
design thinkers as epistemic agents and attempt to 
study the formation and manipulation of knowledge 
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by them, together with their implicit problem-solving 
processes, as well as the mutual interactions between 
designers, design products, and consumers. These aca-
demics work at universities, they publish in journals, 
and they attend conferences on the subject matter. 
Importantly, the primary object of their study is the 
(implicit) thought processes of the designer. This is summa-
rized in the following Table 1:
Table 1. Actors, processes, and objects of design thinking.
Actor Process Object
Consumers Finding or creating 
problems that require 
innovative solutions; 
entering in exchange 
relationship with 
designers; consuming the 
products of designers.
Create problems for, 
enter in exchange 
relationships with, and 
consume the products of 
designers.
Designers/ 
Design 
Thinkers
Designerly or design 
thinking; solving problems 
assigned to them.
Create tangible and 
intangible products that 
solve problems.
Design 
Scholars
Understanding the 
underlying principles, 
methods, and thought 
processes.
Study the processes of 
designerly thinking.
Following Nigel Cross,1 it is valuable to compare 
and contrast design as a mode of inquiry with two 
other major modes of inquiry: the sciences and the 
arts. Specifically, Cross argues that all three are effec-
tively determined and mutually differentiated from 
one another by three factors: the phenomena of their 
study, the methods of their inquiry, and the values 
of their practitioners. Roughly speaking, the sciences 
study physical phenomena, whereas the arts study the 
phenomena of human experience. Scientists conduct 
research using methods such as controlled experimen-
tation, data analysis, and mathematical modeling, 
while the methods used by artists include rhetoric, 
analogy, and prose. Finally, the cultural values in 
the sciences tend to be neutrality, objectivity, and 
rationality; the values embodied by the social organi-
zation of scientific actors can be expanded to include 
communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and 
organized skepticism.2 The values of artists tend to be 
subjectivity, creativity, and imagination. For Cross, the 
corresponding features for designers are as follows: 
the phenomena under study are those of the artificial, 
or man-made (created) world; the methods (or modes 
of inquiry) include modeling, pattern-formation, and 
synthesis; the cultural values include practicality, em-
pathy, and ingenuity.3
To begin inquiring into the principles underlying 
design—the purported aim of design scholars—it is nec-
essary to provide a more exact notion of what design is. 
One definition of design is “the conception and realiza-
tion of new things.”4 Let us unpack this. “Conception” 
has to do with a kind of mental activity, especially one 
that relates to understanding a problem and conceiving 
novel solutions to it. “Realization” is usually the phys-
ical instantiation of a solution (creating a new product, 
for example) but realization may also take a mental or 
conceptual form (as in reflexive amendments). Whereas 
conception simpliciter may be thought of as initial 
problem- formulation and conceiving of novel solutions, 
conception within realization is more appropriately un-
derstood as a mental representation that gets amended 
as a result of alternative physical or conceptual reali-
zations. Consequently, conception and realization are 
often causally bidirectional—conceptually or physically 
realized products can influence designers’ conceptions 
of how well they work, and so new or amended prod-
ucts may be conceived and realized. Specifically, the 
realization that causally impacts a conception could 
be a physical realization, in which case one literally 
perceives that a design solution is ill-suited to a specific 
problem. Or it could be a mental realization, in which 
case one’s experimental thinking alters the conception. 
Finally, “new things” refers to the physical instantia-
tion of a solution that was initially conceived of in the 
mind as a potential remedy for a specific problem. To 
consolidate this, the process of design amounts to the 
conceiving of a solution to a specific problem and then inten-
tionally intervening in the physical world to instantiate that 
solution. For simplicity’s sake, we have excluded from 
the definition the reciprocal relationships that obtain 
between conception and realization. In short, the act of 
design is the physical instantiation of a mental repre-
sentation, which is conceived of as a solution to a par-
ticular problem.
There are distinct forms of knowledge that man-
ifest themselves in the field of design. This is not an out-
landish claim, as it is already well-established within, 
for instance, the Science, Technology, and Society (STS)5 
community that distinct cultures often possess different 
forms of knowledge, and indeed have epistemologies 
that drastically differ from those of others.6 Design may 
thus be understood as a culture that is vastly distinct 
from the sciences and the arts, and by implication, 
one that possesses its own forms of knowledge. The 
knowledge of designers primarily differs from that of, 
say, scientists due to its predominantly tacit or practical 
technological form.7 This type of knowledge is mostly 
gained via practical problem-solving, let alone via theo-
retical understanding alone.
Let us combine the inchoate definition of design as 
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the “conception and realization of new things” with 
the idea that design thinking is primarily centered on 
problem solving. This raises the question: “How does 
a process of this type take place?” Here, we provide 
an outline of what one such process may look like, 
or more radically, some of the features that may be 
common across various design processes.
The process often begins with the designer 
directly perceiving a set of objects, thus creating a 
mental representation of them that is augmented by 
understanding the relations between them. These 
relations are not directly perceived, since they do 
not exist in the physical world. Rather, the designer 
understands them only implicitly; for more complex 
representations, however, conscious effort may be 
required to adequately represent the set of objects 
perceived and, especially, to comprehend the rela-
tions that obtain between them. Within the cognitive 
realm, the designer may find solutions to the problem 
by engaging in thought experiments, spatially rotating 
the objects, rearranging the relations, etc. These activ-
ities are motivated with the goal of finding a practical 
solution to the problem, not understanding the nature 
of the problem itself, though some understanding is 
a requisite for any adequate solution. In order to aid 
her thinking, the designer may create various phys-
ical models that make her mental representations 
more concrete. A model may then be implemented 
in the form of a physical object, which constitutes a 
solution to the initial problem. It is the physical im-
plementation of the solution that is referred to as the 
“design product,” and since most of design thinking is 
oriented towards solving concrete problems—in archi-
tectural, urban planning, and managerial contexts, for 
example—these final, physical products are part and 
parcel of the work of designers. Needless to say, any 
stage in the process can impact any of the preceding 
stages and, in fact, most effective design products 
are rarely, if ever, implementations of the solution 
first conceived. Rather, the final implementations 
that prove effective undergo reciprocal changes in an 
iterative fashion, including those induced by other 
designers, interlocutors, and perceptual and cognitive 
phenomena. In short, the design process begins with 
perceiving a problem and ends with physically imple-
menting a solution to it—though this does not imply 
that the physical implementation does not stimulate 
ideas and solutions for other problems.
Having provided this outline, some general re-
marks about the differences between how scientists 
and designers approach their problems are in order. 
It was remarked above that designers generally are 
not concerned with understanding the nature of a 
problem in its entirety, and instead predominantly care 
only about finding solutions. Scientists, on the other 
hand, when faced with a problem, generally adopt a 
protocol whereby they learn as much as they can, often 
at great intellectual expense, about the nature of the 
problem itself and the underlying rules governing what 
may constitute a viable solution. Scientists often take 
the process of problem-solving to be largely explor-
atory; these offer opportunities to better understand 
the underlying rules governing the behavior of expla-
nanda. By contrast, the general protocol of designers is 
to try a number of different solutions until one of them 
works. Indeed, in an experimental study where de-
signers and scientists were asked to organize blocks in 
such a way that they would satisfy a set of rules, some 
of which were never explicitly stated, the scientists gen-
erally took the strategy of exhaustively trying different 
attempts with the goal of learning all of the rules, and 
then trying to satisfy them. The designers, by compar-
ison, generally did not take this strategy, instead opting 
more frequently for a procedure of guessing using 
creative attempts in search of a solution.8 The design-
er’s approach indicates that understanding the nature 
of the problem serves a role that is subservient to the 
task of finding a workable solution. A problem is to 
be understood insofar as it helps in finding a solution. 
Here, the underlying assumption is that the value of 
a designer’s work is assessed in terms of its pragmatic 
utility, whereas the value of a scientists’ work is as-
sessed largely by the consistency of their theories with 
experimental results (in light of the precision of the 
relevant instruments).
Echoing the idea that varying cultures often 
embody different epistemologies, we see an analogy 
between, on the one hand, scientists and coherence 
theory of truth and, on the other hand, designers and 
pragmatist theory of truth. If one adopts a coherence 
theory of truth, then one views the degree of truth 
of a set of propositions as being proportional to their 
mutual coherence and consistency.9 If, however, one 
adopts a pragmatic theory of truth, then one measures 
the truth of a collection of propositions by the degree 
to which it enables one to succeed at completing tasks 
in the world.10 Analogously, scientists may be viewed as 
coherentists about the products they  produce—theories, 
experimental observations, technical  instruments—in 
the sense that they are predominantly occupied with 
constructing theories and performing highly precise 
measurements that are mutually consistent. However, 
by the same token, designers may be understood as 
pragmatists about their products because they are 
largely, if not exclusively, driven by the need to accom-
plish some sort of task. Importantly, reference to the 
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coherence of their design processes and tools is seldom 
present, and often, it is entirely absent. Indeed, con-
tradictions in design processes are notably difficult to 
provide a theoretical account for.11 
Nevertheless, science and design are not mutually 
exclusive categories. Rather, they inhabit diametrically 
opposed ends of the same continuum. One example 
in which scientific approaches and design practices 
coexist is in the research and development (R&D) 
departments of various corporations. Here, the need 
for expedience often overpowers scientific rigor in 
part because the motivation for applying scientific 
tools is production of products, which is inherently 
pragmatic. The corporate structure often undermines 
scientific rigor by failing to encourage article publi-
cations, peer review, etc. It appears, then, that people 
working in the R&D sector of private industries com-
bine parts of coherentist and pragmatist theories of 
truth, and they give each a different degree of impor-
tance depending on both their goals and the stage of 
the research process they may be in.
The Problematic Practices of Design Scholars 
We have thus far provided in outline a framework 
within which to understand design and design 
thinking. Recall that design scholars are academics 
who aim to understand the principles underlying 
design processes and designerly thinking. The pur-
pose of this section is to evaluate the work of design 
scholars (not designers, who are merely the object of 
study of the design scholars). Our discussion is largely 
delimited to the methods of design scholars and to 
what constitutes justification in the field, though our 
criticisms are connected to the theoretical content 
of the field. We conclude that the work of design 
scholars has foundational shortcomings.
Ambiguity
Ambiguity is to be understood as a measure of how 
ill-defined the terms and concepts, and how under-
determined the theories in a field are. Put differently, 
ambiguity corresponds to how prone a reader of 
a field’s literature is to misunderstanding or mis-
interpreting the claims made, even after being suffi-
ciently exposed to the fundamentals. Undoubtedly, 
almost all academic disciplines are ambiguous to 
varying degrees, since it is virtually impossible to 
present a complex idea in such a way that no room is 
left for misinterpretation or misunderstanding. Pure 
mathematics, which is completely axiomatic- deductive 
in nature and where every term is explicitly and 
precisely defined, is almost an exception, and would 
correspond to the closest thing academia has to a per-
fectly unambiguous discipline. Moreover, the degree to 
which ambiguity characterizes each discipline varies 
widely. For instance, physics is generally very precise 
in its use of technical terminology, which is often 
couched in mathematical formalisms that bear some 
explicit correspondence to physical entities in the 
world. Other fields, notably humanities or social scien-
tific fields like STS, are more ambiguous in their termi-
nology. For instance, it is very hard to find a definition 
that is unique and not merely intuitive for a term like 
“social construction.” Generally speaking, fields that 
operationalize their variables in quantitative terms 
tend to be less ambiguous than those that rely on qual-
itative descriptions. The quantitative and qualitative 
characterizations often neatly map onto the sciences 
and humanities, respectively, though there are excep-
tions and other differences between the two modes of 
inquiry.
Our comments on ambiguity are not be taken 
to mean that any field that is ambiguous is somehow 
degraded or less valuable. After all, poetry and litera-
ture, both of which permit deep academic investiga-
tion, are both extremely ambiguous quite frequently, 
and indeed this is a virtue for them, as they would lose 
their value if they read like scientific articles. How-
ever, disciplines that (implicitly) purport to study in a 
robust manner the general principles underlying the 
workings of a given phenomenon ought to be more 
precise. Ambiguity is never to be valued for its own 
sake, and arguably, not for its consequences either 
because its proliferation leads to loss of clarity. With 
these preliminary remarks in mind, we now illustrate 
not only that an unacceptably high degree of ambi-
guity is a pathological feature of academic work in 
design, but also that the methods of design thinking 
scholars effectively perpetuate this ambiguity. Impor-
tantly, our analysis is primarily based on a number of 
papers recently published in this journal.12 
A ubiquitous problem in the field is the am-
biguity surrounding the methods and practices of 
design scholars. The first problem is that it is un-
clear what “design thinking” actually refers to.13 Is 
it supposed to be a type of scientific inquiry? Is it a 
social practice? Is it a mode of critical thinking or 
of artistic pursuit? Furthermore, the literature on 
design does not specify whether design thinking is 
an object of study, or whether it is a set of methodol-
ogies and practices of the scholars themselves. If it is 
the former, then inquiry into its nature is the task of 
design scholars. If it is the latter, then these consti-
tute techniques for studying the nature of some other 
phenomenon (whatever it may be). It is also unclear 
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whether design thinking is a feature of the designers 
proper or whether it is a reflective characterization of 
the scholarly field of design.
Whatever the case may be, one cannot separate 
the processes and acts of designing from its creators. 
Crucially, there is no design thinking without design 
thinkers. Unlike in the natural sciences, where a rea-
sonable argument can be made that the purported 
object of study exists and behaves in accordance with 
a set of laws external to the investigator, in the field 
of design it is impossible to decouple the processes 
of design thinking from the social system in which 
it is contrived. For instance, whereas Born’s rule 
would accurately describe the actual frequencies of 
quantum mechanical phenomena even if Max Born 
had never written it down, it is difficult to likewise 
understand the processes of design thinking required 
to produce the Pyramid at the Louvre without talking 
about I. M. Pei and the wider social context. Indeed, 
the socio-cultural factors seem integral to the process 
of design. As such, a social constructionist account 
of design thinking would not only be permissible, 
but also preferable to a less socially-grounded under-
standing. Useful though it may be for (quantitatively) 
understanding the nature of certain phenomena, 
social construction does not easily permit a coherent, 
unambiguous, and precise formalization. Thus, design 
thinking, even when it is understood within a social 
constructionist framework, is essentially ambiguous.
Although we have clearly delineated the catego-
ries of actor, process, and object, as well as some of the 
relationships between them, the literature on design 
thinking lacks a unifying thread. Indeed, the field has, 
for instance, been described as convoluted.14 And who 
can be surprised? Buchanan writes, 
“[Design scholars], who increasingly come from 
diverse professions and academic disciplines, are 
not drawn together because they share a common 
definition of design; a common methodology, a 
common philosophy, or even a common set of 
objects to which everyone agrees that the term 
‘design’ should be applied.”15 
It is not uncommon to see scholars discussing design 
thinking as a process and as an object and as a product, 
without clear separation between these different kinds 
of entities. Additionally, design scholars commonly use 
the term “designerly” to refer to processes of design 
thinking that are supposedly good or appropriate. 
Here, designers who engage in the process of design-
erly thinking, which is a qualified notion of design 
thinking, become objects of scholars’ study. Often, this 
is an attempt to reflexively apply the “right” type of 
design thinking to the work of scholars themselves. 
More frequently than not, the reflexive application 
of designerly thinking goes unnoticed. Linking these 
various uses of the same term reinforces our points 
that the methods and practices of design scholars are 
pathologically ambiguous. To fully illustrate this point, 
we rely on Linda Laursen and Louise Hasse’s16 recent 
survey of the literature to organize various definitions 
and methodologies of design thinking and designerly 
thinking in the table below. Laursen and Hasse de-
scribe designerly thinking as the field of study occu-
pied with understanding design thinking. We have 
faithfully retained their labels (Table 2).
Table 2. A multitude of definitions and methodologies for designerly thinking and design. A summary based on Laursen and Hasse, 
“The Shortcomings of Design Thinking When Compared to Designerly Thinking.”
Designerly Thinking (intermediate/ 
interdisciplinary)
Design Thinking/ Design
Theoretical 
Approaches
1. To understand design practice and to establish 
itself as an independent academic discipline.a
2. As “creation of artefacts” and development of 
a rational, repeatable design methodology.b
3. Solving (non-rational) “wicked problems.”c
4. “Reflective” practice.d
5. Problem-solving is abductive, neither 
deductive nor inductive.e
6. Practice-based approach to solving problems, 
making sense of things in a context, and 
developing new knowledge,f where a solution 
is measured based on its value in a context.g
Design thinking 
and designerly 
thinking have 
different focuses, 
but the two 
concepts are 
intimately related.h
1. A label for exporting IDEO’s design processes 
and methods outside the context of design by 
people without a background in design (e.g., 
managers, educators).i
2. An iterative cycle of innovation involving 
proposal generation, prediction, testing, and 
generalization; primarily done for business 
purposes.j
3. A management theory in its own right.k 
4. Solving wicked problems.l
5. Abductive reasoning as the logic of possibility,m 
including data-driven analytical thinking and 
intuition.n
6. Truth criteria is contextual meaning-making.o
(Continued on next page…)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Methodological 
Approaches
1. “Reflective” practice during action and in 
retrospect.p 
2. The problem and solution develop together 
via an iterative process,q leading to greater 
understanding of both.r
3. Framing and reframing as providing new 
directions to the designer.s 
4. Creation of physical models, sketches, and 
prototypes to engage with the situation.t
5. Identifying the right solutionu that is 
meaningful in a contextv in light of users’ 
values.w
6. Shift attention between larger and smaller 
tasks, and shift between analysis, synthesis, 
and evaluation.x
7. Tools used can be subdivided into those used 
for inquiry, identification, and creation.y
1. Explorative learning with wicked problems 
requiring iterative processes.z
Normative 
Approaches
1. Phase models consist of three to five steps (e.g., 
inspiration, ideation) organized in an iterative 
or circular fashion.aa 
2. Perspective models underscore the importance 
of considering various stakeholders.ab
Tools 1. Very many tools being used.ac
a. Laursen and Hasse, “The Shortcomings of Design Thinking.”
b. Herbert A. Simon, The Science of the Artificial, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1969); John Christopher, “The State-of-the-Art in Design Methods,” 
in Design Methods in Architecture, no. 6, ed. Geoffrey Broadbent and Anthony 
Ward (London: Lund Humphries, 1969), 193–97.
c. Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General 
Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (1973):155–69, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1007/BF01405730; Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design Thinking”; 
Bryan Lawson, How Designers Think: The Design Process Demystified (Oxford: 
Architectural Press, 2006); Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing.
d. Donald A. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action 
(New York: Basic Books, 1983).
e. Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing; Lawson, How Designers Think; Kees Dorst, 
“The Core of ‘Design Thinking’ and Its Application,” Design Studies 32, no. 
6 (2011): 521–32, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.destud.2011.07.006; Rittel and 
Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.”
f. Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design Thinking”; Lawson, How Designers 
Think; Klaus Krippendorff, The Semantic Turn: A New Foundation for Design (New 
York: CRC Press/Taylor and Francis Group, 2006); Cross, Designerly Ways of 
Knowing.
g. Krippendorff, The Semantic Turn.
h. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner; Lawson, How Designers Think; Cross, Designerly 
Ways of Knowing; Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design Thinking.”
i. Tom Kelley, The Art of Innovation (New York: Doubleday, 2001).
j. David Dunne and Roger Martin, “Design Thinking and How It Will 
Change Management Education: An Interview and Discussion,” Academy 
of Management Learning & Education 5, no. 4 (2006): 512–23, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.5465/amle.2006.23473212.
k. Richard J. Boland and Fred Collopy, eds., Managing as Designing (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Johansson-Sköldberg et al., “Design 
Thinking”; Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing.
l. Boland and Collopy, Managing as Designing; Tim Brown, “Design Thinking,” 
Harvard Business Review (2008): 84–92, available at https://hbr.org/2008/06/
design-thinking; Roger Martin, The Design of Business: Why Design Thinking is the 
Next Competitive Advantage (Harvard Business Review Press 2009), 7–11.
m. Boland and Collopy, Managing as Designing; Brown, “Design Thinking”; 
Martin, The Design of Business.
n. Martin, The Design of Business.
o. Brown, “Design Thinking”; Jeanne Liedtka and Tim Ogilvie, Designing for 
Growth: A Design Thinking Toolkit for Managers (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2011), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004; Roberto 
Verganti, Design-Driven Innovation: Changing the Rules of Competition by Radically 
Innovating What Things Mean (Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2009).
p. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner; Lawson, How Designers Think; Cross, Designerly 
Ways of Knowing; Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design Thinking.”
q. Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing.
r. Kees Dorst and Nigel Cross, “Creativity in the Design Process: Co-evolution 
of Problem-Solution,” Design Studies 22, no. 5 (2001): 425–37, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0142-694X(01)00009-6.
s. Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design Thinking”; Dorst, “The Core of 
‘Design Thinking’ and Its Application.”
t. Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing; Schön, The Reflective Practitioner.
u. Cross, Designerly Ways of Knowing.
v. Krippendorff, The Semantic Turn.
w. Dorst, “The Core of ‘Design Thinking’ and Its Application.”
x. Ömer Akin and Chengtah Lin, “Design Protocol Data and Novel Design 
Decisions,” Design Studies 16, no. 2 (1995): 211–36, DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1016/0142-694X(94)00010-B.
y. Laursen and Hasse, “The Shortcomings of Design Thinking,” 8, for details.
z. Brown, “Design Thinking”; Kelley, The Art of Innovation; Sara L. Beckman 
and Michael Barry, “Innovation as a Learning Process: Embedding Design 
Thinking,” California Management Review 50, no. 1 (2007): 25–56, DOI: https://
doi.org/10.2307/41166415.
aa. André L. Fleury, Henrique Stabile, and Marly M. de Carvalho, “An Overview 
of the Literature on Design Thinking: Trends and Contributions,” 
International Journal of Engineering Education 32, no. 4 (2016): 1704–18, available 
at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306031700.
ab. Kelley, The Art of Innovation; Verganti, Design-Driven Innovation; Liedtka and 
Ogilvie, Designing for Growth.
ac. see Fleury et al., “An Overview of the Literature on Design Thinking” for 
details.
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Analogies with Cognitive Science 
A number of recent papers published in this journal16 
rely in one way or another on cognitive science to 
lend legitimacy to the claims made by design scholars. 
Because cognitive science is a well-established and 
respectable discipline, it makes sense to utilize its 
experimental results and theories to explain the 
practices of designers. Moreover, given its focus on 
understanding the processes of problem-solving, 
cognitive science seems relevant for understanding 
design processes as grounded in human cognition and 
problem solving. However, it is one thing to utilize 
these results to explain the cognitive or affective 
processes designers undergo and quite another to 
simply import the specialized terminology to provide 
metaphorical or heuristic descriptions of what de-
signers putatively do during their thinking processes. 
The former constitutes a legitimate type of scientific 
explanation, whereas the latter is simply an attempt 
to bootstrap unjustified claims by finding loosely 
connected similarities and analogies between the two 
disciplines. At best, scholars of design rely on cogni-
tive scientific resources without providing reasons for 
thinking that the analogies between cognitive scien-
tific results and corresponding design explananda are 
strong enough to support legitimate explanations. 
Even though analogous reasoning may sometimes 
count as a legitimate form of explanation, using only 
analogous reasoning in this context raises the worry 
that there are no distinctively design-centric explana-
tions. Accordingly, it is unclear as to what exactly are 
the contributions that design thinkers are making in 
furthering our understanding of design processes. 
Analogies with cognitive science fail to provide 
(scientific) explanations. Let us use a very simple 
example to illustrate this point. Psychologists found 
that the reaction times for comprehension are higher 
if people read the sentence, “push the drawer open,” 
than if they read the sentence, “pull the drawer 
open.”18 That is, when the sentence they read was 
bodily impossible, it took them longer to under-
stand it. There are at least two contender theories of 
language processing. Proponents of the first theory 
maintain that linguistic processing is amodal, so it 
can be explained without invoking embodiment. The 
advocates of the second theory claim that embodi-
ment is a crucial aspect of language comprehension. 
The amodal thesis cannot explain the differential 
reaction times, but the second theory seems capable 
of doing so. Thus, the experimental results here favor 
the interpretation that language processing has some-
thing to do with embodiment. Minimally, it rules out 
the amodal thesis as a serious alternative. Utilizing 
research on embodiment, design scholars metaphor-
ically refer to there being a “sense of fit,” which the 
designer has in virtue of being an embodied and affec-
tive agent.19 Verganti,20 for instance, argues without 
explanation that the process of design also has lin-
guistic aspects, which are to be understood in terms 
of symbolic manipulation. No doubt that in addition 
to being embodied and affective agents, designers 
are also linguistic ones! Yet, an explanation within 
the design framework is lacking as to why this is the 
case, and if it is, how it explains the design-specific 
phenomena that Verganti and other design scholars 
intend to explain. Cognitive scientists’ finding that 
language comprehension has something to do with 
embodiment does not warrant that simple redescrip-
tions (without technical details) can constitute expla-
nations of design processes that are either (cognitive) 
scientific or distinctively designerly.
Generally speaking, similarity with cognitive 
science is taken to constitute an explanation in the 
field of design scholarship. Specifically, for an object 
of study in cognitive science that bears a similarity 
relation, including analogous relations, with an 
object in the field of design, if an explanation of the 
former object is provided in cognitive science, then 
this explanation is often imported for the object of 
study in design.21 Again, the explanation is imported 
in the sense that mere redescriptions of the original 
are provided without any technical details. This type 
of explanation, however, is a non-sequitur, because 
the similarity relation does not constitute a relation 
of identity; in fact, reasons in favor of thinking that 
explanations from cognitive science distribute to the 
domain of design are lacking. Therefore, reliance on 
cognitive science constitutes neither explanations of 
nor justifications for the phenomena to be explained 
in the field of design. To be clear, we are not arguing 
against the use of metaphors or analogies per se. These 
play important heuristic and pedagogical functions 
in highlighting important similarities and differences 
between concepts. However, in an academic discipline 
aiming to understand a phenomenon, it is not enough 
to merely have analogical and similarity relationships. 
A lot more needs to be said by way of an explana-
tion to convince a reasonably skeptical reader that 
the scholars are making some headway in providing 
general principles that explain the phenomena in 
question.
Another problem is that the work in cognitive 
science does not seem to immediately provide appli-
cable explanans for the domain of design, because the 
former discipline is unambiguous (or, at least, has 
precisely formulated theses), it bears a relationship to 
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the physical world and to other sciences, and so on, 
whereas it is not even clear what the object of study 
in design is. Providing recommendations to designers, 
Lawrence Barsalou,22 himself a respected cognitive 
neuroscientist, writes, “cognitive science offers scien-
tific explanations for understanding the design pro-
cess in terms of cognitive and affective mechanisms.” 
His point is relevant to the explanations provided by 
design scholars insofar as the object of study in this 
field are human beings who think and feel. However, 
the question then is, “What are the scientific or ac-
ademic contributions of design scholars?” It is not 
that, as far as we are aware, the scholars of design 
have carved out a domain of study that is distinctively 
designerly, or that in design thinking there are fea-
tures that cannot be explained by appeal to cognitive 
science.23 In fact, the appeal to cognitive science 
is justified only if (i) the object of study of design 
scholars is relegated to that of cognitive science, or 
(ii) the object of study is reduced to cognitive sciences 
(and, possibly, to its most fundamental constitutive 
discipline).
If choice (i) is taken, then it would be conceded 
that though there is something distinctive about 
design that needs explanation, we (somehow) care 
only about those aspects of design that cognitive 
sciences can appropriately explain. As we mentioned 
above, this is akin to saying that the object of study 
of design scholars is explicable only as much as the 
object of study is a human agent capable of thinking 
and emoting. By contrast, if option (ii) is taken, then 
there is nothing left for the scholars of design to ex-
plain. A reductionist approach implies that the object 
of study is no longer available for design- centric 
explanation.24 However, for a reductionist approach 
to be palatable, design scholars would need to permit 
the reduction of “designerly processes” to the domain 
of cognitive science, whose own explananda may 
itself (ideally) reduce to the physical sciences. Prob-
lematically, it does not seem to us that this is a viable 
notion, as part of the underlying assumptions behind 
design thinking is a rejection of strong ontological 
reductionism, if not a rejection of ontological mate-
rialism itself. Consequently, such an approach is a 
non-starter for these scholars.
So far, option (ii) seems unacceptable but option 
(i) has some merit, since the practices of design 
scholars suggest that appeal to cognitive science is 
acceptable. While there is something distinctive about 
design’s object(s) of study, and thus, it is in need of 
proper explication, the state of scholarly work is not 
up to the task of providing such explanations. Cogni-
tive science can only go so far in explaining the object 
of study of design. Those features of design processes 
that are taken to be independent of the underlying 
cognitive and socio-cognitive effects deserve consider-
ation that is distinctively designerly.25 Even in cases 
where cognitive sciences can in principle explain 
aspects of the design processes, such explanations 
(which design scholars attempt to provide) cannot be 
merely metaphorical and heuristic. More importantly, 
when cognitive science does not go far enough—in 
other words, when it does not fully explain every-
thing that the scholars of design intend to explain—
the task is left to these scholars to provide robust and 
precise explanations grounded in falsifiable empirical 
evidence.
Standards of Evidence and Justification
Recent scholarship in design relies greatly on cogni-
tive science both for its theoretical framework and 
for its experimental justification. We now briefly 
address the standards of justification used in the field 
of design and the evidence presented in favor of the 
claims being advanced. We conclude that the stan-
dards of justification which the field holds itself to are 
completely inadequate for considering it a scientific 
discipline.
It is well-recognized by philosophers of science, 
and indeed by most practicing scientists, that for a 
theoretical claim to be acceptable within the frame-
work of modern science, it must be falsifiable:26 
it must, in other words, in principle be possible to 
refute it.27 A standard method by which a theory may 
be refuted is by finding convincing (theoretical or 
empirical) evidence to the contrary. Ordinarily, ex-
perimental evidence is impugned if others follow the 
same experimental procedures but fail to replicate 
it, or if the replicated experiment produces results 
that are inconsistent with those of the original ex-
periment. Empirical evidence is used to adjudicate 
between competing models and theories. Ideally, a 
number of experimental results favor one model in 
such a way that alternative explanations are ruled 
out, in the sense that they fail to explain the data or 
the data are inconsistent with the theoretical predic-
tions. The important point is that empirical evidence 
serves as the basis upon which theoretical claims are 
judged.28 
Justifications of theoretical propositions based 
on experimentation rely, in one way or another, on 
inductive inferences, which are in principle fallible. 
Because the nomological domain is finite and induc-
tive generalizations are about this domain, these 
generalizations are fallible because there could in 
principle be an evidential instance that counts against 
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the generalization. However, philosophers of science 
recognize that, fallible though they may be, inductive 
generalizations provide reasonable, and perhaps even 
probabilistic, propositions about the world.29 There is 
agreement about one thing: the degree to which one 
is justified in making inductive generalizations cru-
cially depends on the number of evidential instances 
in support of that generalization. The higher the 
number of evidential instances in favor of the gener-
alization, the more the agent is justified in believing 
it. Let us evaluate the implications of these points for 
the use of anecdotal evidence in the field of design.
Before we evaluate the use of anecdotal evidence 
in the field of design, recall the distinction between 
the practice of design and the scholarly study of 
design thinking. The former, as a pragmatically ori-
ented practice, has implicit notions of success and 
failure that depend on the satisfaction of the con-
sumer. In this capacity, the measure of the success 
of a design can be understood in terms of anecdotes. 
Moreover, the replication and proliferation of some 
design products may also be justified by these anec-
dotal instances. For instance, positive reviews based 
on personal experience may provide justifications for 
designers to continue producing the product. How-
ever, our contentions apply only insofar as we are 
concerned with the scholarly study of design. It is in 
this latter context that, as we shall argue, the usage of 
anecdotal evidence is inadmissible.
Anecdotal evidence is empirical observation or 
experiential interpretation, which may be exogenous 
or endogenous, that provides very weak justification 
for inductive generalizations in part due to the scarce 
number of non-repeatable instances. Therefore, an-
ecdotal evidence does not provide grounds for rea-
sonable inductive generalizations, as practically most 
other evidential instances would count against such a 
generalization. Moreover, anecdotal evidence is often 
subjective, taking the form of either direct experience 
or reporting others’ experiences. Conducting a study 
of anecdotal evidence in public scientific controver-
sies, Alfred Moore and Jack Stilgoe write, “anecdotal 
evidence comes to be accepted (albeit in different 
ways) by the main actors as an epistemic category, yet 
that [sic] it is multidimensional, open to interpreta-
tion as subjective reports.”30 They further write that 
“anecdotes and anecdotal evidence are clearly indi-
vidual, and thus lend themselves to reconstruction 
in terms of ‘subjective’ versus ‘objective’ modes of 
thought.”31 Consequently, it is impossible to falsify 
anecdotal evidence, because to do so is to conclu-
sively refute a subjective experience occurring either 
in a single moment or over a span of time. Because 
anecdotal evidence is unfalsifiable, it cannot be used 
to support inductive inferences, and thus, it cannot be 
admitted in the sciences.
Within the study of design thinking, it is not un-
common to find claims being justified with anecdotal 
evidence.32 Anecdotal evidence may be garnered by 
observing the process of a single design project and/or 
by looking at a single team of designers working on a 
problem. Some design scholars33 even go so far as to 
present fictional scenarios (complete with characters) 
as legitimate evidence in favor of certain claims.34 We 
can see that design scholars in fact do use anecdotal 
evidence, and other even more pathologically flawed 
forms of evidence as providing justificatory grounds 
for their explanations.
It is undoubtedly true that the phenomenolog-
ical dimension is crucial for studying and experi-
encing design. Thus, there is a prima facie reason for 
admitting anecdotal evidence to adjudicate between 
different models, and any empirical evidence in this 
discipline would necessarily be subjective to a certain 
degree. The evidence-centric problems nevertheless 
abound even if anecdotal evidence is admitted. First, 
literature in cognitive sciences tells us that memo-
ries are unreliable. In particular, when memories are 
retrieved, they are amenable to modification due to 
so-called “top-down” cognitive effects. After being 
impacted by these effects, the re-encoded (or reconsol-
idated) memories in the hippocampus are often very 
different from those that were initially encoded.35 
Accordingly, if reconsolidated memories are used as 
evidence to support a certain model of designerly 
thinking, and if this model was the top-down cogni-
tive effect impacting the memory, then the structure 
of this reasoning process constitutes a case of cir-
cular reasoning. More concretely, if a design scholar 
supports a particular model as providing satisfactory 
explanations of some designerly phenomena, and 
in order to highlight to his colleagues the intuitive 
appeal of the model, he recalls the particular anec-
dote in question (thus, impacting the memory, as ex-
plained), and later, if he uses the (affected) anecdotal 
evidence in support of the model, then the argument 
is circular. In short, the model affects the memory 
(anecdote) and the memory supports the model.
Second, the effects of various heuristics that sub-
jects fall prey to are well-documented in the psycho-
logical literature. We will use the availability heuristic 
as a representative case to demonstrate how anec-
dotal evidence can be impugned. Our explanation, 
though, is generalizable, namely, anecdotal evidence 
is negatively impacted by other types of heuristics 
as well. Roughly, the availability heuristic is the idea 
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that if certain information is more easily recalled, 
then the subject judges it to have higher probability.36 
Now, in debating the merits and demerits of a model, 
design scholars will recall certain anecdotes—experi-
ences, for example—more easily than they will recall 
others. Since they would be influenced by the models 
they take to be more plausible, it is unsurprising 
that they would more easily find anecdotal evidence 
supporting the model than evidence contradicting it. 
Given the availability heuristic, it would appear that 
there are a great many evidential instances favoring 
the model. Thus, a large amount of evidence in sup-
port of the model will be recalled, and only a small 
amount of evidence (if any) against the model will 
be recalled.37 Given these considerations, skepticism 
about anecdotal evidence is our best bet.
Lastly, people can simply make up anecdotes to 
support their theories! There is no way of judging 
these anecdotes, as the only judge of an experience 
is the person having it. Consequently, there could in 
principle always be counter and favoring evidence 
with respect to a model, wherever there is enough in-
genuity and unscrupulousness on the part of certain 
people! Nevertheless, the claims of unfalsifiability 
and research from memory and heuristics serve as 
the best reasons for rejecting anecdotal evidence as 
reliable grounds for believing in inductive generaliza-
tions. Even if design scholars reject falsificationism 
on philosophical grounds, research in cognitive sci-
ence cannot be ignored, especially given that design 
scholars intimately rely on this discipline.
To our knowledge, anecdotal evidence and sec-
ondary evidence from other fields constitute the 
main forms of support for claims made by design 
scholars. We have considered why the former type 
of evidence is problematic, and we have also consid-
ered what is problematic with the latter type. Now, 
a few comments summarizing the points about the 
structure of justification are in order. First, (unfalsifi-
able) anecdotal evidence is an insufficient basis upon 
which to make inductive generalizations. Second, the 
use of anecdotal evidence, which intimately depends 
on human memory, to support theories gives rise to 
viciously circular reasoning. The theory fixes its ev-
idence, which then justifies the theory in question. 
Third, reliance on cognitive science works only in 
limited cases, namely those in which the object of 
study are the cognitive and affective dimensions of 
designers. Vague relations of similarities, having a 
sense that two ideas are related, or utilization of ter-
minology in a non-technical fashion do not give suffi-
cient grounds for considering a proposition justified. 
It is not enough to say that cognitive scientists talk 
about embodiment and affect, and since these terms 
also have something to do with the process of design, 
the two concepts are applicable to the latter domain. 
We therefore normatively suggest that not only 
should design scholars apply (if at all) the concepts 
of cognitive science with the same degree of rigor 
with which they are applied in the original discipline, 
these scholars also need to provide explanations, 
justifications, and evidence that are distinctively de-
signerly if we are to consider the discipline unique in 
its own right. Additionally, as anecdotal evidence fails 
to be sufficient for any sort of scientific explanation, 
and it appears as though anecdotes are one of the 
only modes of empirical evidence that design scholars 
use, we suggest that the community, as it were, re-
brand itself to orient more towards a social studies 
discipline, such as STS or sociology of science, that is 
concerned with studying the humanistic and social 
aspects of how various forms of knowledge, methods, 
and reasoning-processes develop and manifest them-
selves in the world. These fields have well-established 
methodologies that grapple with problems similar 
to those faced by design scholars. Such an approach 
would at least provide fruitful directions for future 
research. The current state of affairs in design, how-
ever, is misaligned with the aims of STS or sociology 
of science. As it currently stands, the field at times 
appears to be pseudoscientific.
Conclusions
It is not an exaggeration to exhort design scholars to 
develop a more robust and precise agenda for their 
field. First, it needs to be made clear whether they 
construe their field as a particularly rich and unique 
extension of cognitive science, or if it is to be sub-
sumed under the social sciences with close ties to STS. 
On the one hand, if they consider it an extension of 
cognitive science, then the following non-exhaustive 
list of minimal criteria must be satisfied: 
(1) The object of study for design scholars needs 
to be clearly articulated by, for instance, thor-
oughly and clearly explicating the underlying 
principles of creative processes that guide 
design thinking, as well as what constitutes 
an instance of design thinking as a cognitive 
process. 
(2) Concepts ought to be defined rigorously and 
applied consistently; metaphorical and heu-
ristic usage of terminology, while useful in 
providing readers with a general sense of the 
idea, is unacceptable in a mature field of sci-
ence. The scholars in this field need to likewise 
353Comments on Understanding Is a Design Problem
precisely define and consistently apply the defi-
nitions, which no doubt may be used only ten-
tatively, that they develop. The starting point 
may be to provide a definition of design38 and 
decide whether it is a natural kind. 
(3) Once such a clear, precise, and detailed frame-
work is established, design scholars must 
identify how this framework is situated with 
respect to standard ideas from cognitive sci-
ence. For instance, is the design process to be 
understood within a generally materialistic 
framework? How crucial of a role does embodi-
ment play here? Is syntactic processing explan-
atorily relevant? What is the role of affect? 
(4) Empirical evidence that is testable by others, 
including those in other fields, needs to be 
provided in support of claims. Anecdotes,39 
fictional characters,40 or first-person41 ac-
counts do not count as falsifiable evidence, 
and so they cannot be used in a scientific field, 
though the phenomenological dimension of 
design is no doubt important. Further, the ev-
idence can, and even should, draw upon other 
disciplines in the sense that primary research 
can be done by scholars in this field using 
reliable methodologies from other fields, such 
as using fMRI to study the cognitive neurosci-
entific mechanisms of creative processes. Of 
course, this does not preclude the possibility 
of having exclusively design-centric evidence, 
whatever that may look like—but at least for 
the short run, reliance on the methodologies 
of established scientific disciplines would be a 
commendable starting point. Indeed, it would 
be excellent to provide an outline of what a 
distinctively design experimental methodology 
may look like.
On the other hand, if scholars choose to characterize 
their discipline as a social scientific pursuit, (as we 
suggest they ought), then the discipline may be better 
served by considering the sociological, structural, 
affective, and phenomenological features of the con-
sumption and production of design products. One of 
the crucial parts of design is the transformative ex-
perience a consumer may have as a result of being in 
a creatively designed place. These may be important 
in understanding the role of design in society, in-
cluding how consumers create problems requiring 
design solutions. Furthermore, studying what makes 
a particular design more effective than another and 
quantifying the degree of success of a design solution, 
investigating the perceptions of various designs by 
customers (in different cultures), and understanding 
design processes through interdisciplinary lenses 
(for example, design within resource constraints) are 
interesting questions deserving close scrutiny. With 
this new territory, the field would, of course, require 
a new set of methodologies motivated by those of 
the social sciences. Although these methodologies 
may need to be altered to accommodate the unique 
features of design as a discipline, there still remains 
a necessary standard of explanation and empirical 
evidence that the current framework would need to 
adjust to. However, if such social scientific methodolo-
gies were to be adopted, one could be much more con-
fident in the various claims made by design scholars, 
which presently are little more than conjecture, on 
the grounds that the social sciences have established 
methodologies that deal with issues such as lack of 
empirical basis for theoretical claims. Needless to say, 
this would need to be applied by keeping design’s 
uniqueness in mind.
As previously mentioned, Cross thought of design 
as being distinct from the arts and sciences.42 How-
ever, it is important to remember that the discipline 
of design scholarship is a distinct category from that 
of design proper (design scholars are not designers, 
unless there exists an accidental intersection of 
actors), and so it is not outlandish to suppose that 
design scholarship may indeed closely resemble some 
form of pre-existing academic discipline, be it one of 
scientific nature (like cognitive science), or one that 
is more sociologically oriented (such as STS). As we 
have argued, the discipline of design does not have a 
well-delineated agenda as to what its object of study 
is, what the employed methodologies are, and so 
forth. Hence, unless design scholars can define their 
discipline in a way that distinguishes it from the arts 
and social sciences, our suggestion would be to stick 
closer to well-delineated paths (of artistic and sci-
entific pursuits) and define the discipline according 
to the interests and abilities of those engaged with 
this field. Once again, as a cautionary note, we are 
not criticizing the designers proper, the consumers, 
businesses, or other stakeholders; our criticism is 
laid against the academics that write books, publish 
in journals, attend conferences, and lack a unifying 
basis of thought. Systems of academic research are 
allowed to become extremely sophisticated and intri-
cate. However, if they lack a consistent set of methods 
and practices, if they have low standards for justifica-
tion, and if the underlying framework of their field is 
highly ambiguous and only partially developed, more 
advanced, complicated theoretical hypotheses are no 
more than castles in the sky.
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Let me begin by quoting the very end of Michael 
 Lissack’s article, Part 1:
“This Part 1 has introduced the reader to the 
ideas of limited cognitive capacity, the law of 
requisite variety, the least action principle, 
and the contrast between representations 
and compressions. Part 2 will focus on how 
those concepts come together in our under-
standing toolkit. In Part 2, the reader will 
learn about 5 kinds of tools: models, choosing 
what we attend to, selecting among adjacent 
possibles, priming the context, and highlighting/
suppressing questioning. The emphasis in part 2 
is on agency and choice—we choose those aspects 
of the world we attend to and the frames and 
backgrounds we apply in then making sense of 
the items we chose. Understanding is a product 
of choices that are forced upon us as we seek 
to overcome the mismatch between the relent-
lessly rich, interwoven complexity of the world 
and our minds’ limited ability to cope with it 
all. When we recognize that we can actively 
choose rather than merely accept what appears 
to be a pre-given conclusion, we open the door to 
agency. And agency opens our understanding to 
the myriad possibilities of design.”1
Michael emphasizes that at any given time we, as 
observers and cognizers, have a limited channel of 
access to the complex world in which we live. He 
points out our inability to handle large amounts of 
information and our consequent reliance on summa-
ries, beliefs, and simplifications. He points out that a 
cybernetic point of view, with awareness of our own 
role in shaping our thoughts and perceptions and ac-
tions, will result in a more effective relationship with 
the complex world. In this regard, he recommends 
that we each become the designers of our relation-
ships with the world. The relationship of a designer 
is a relationship of a person with his intent to create 
(that which he designs).2 A designer must be willing 
to question implicit rules for himself and society. He 
must have a sufficiently complex relationship with his 
creative material (requisite variety) to allow the cre-
ativity to take place. He must find the paths of most 
efficient action for his being in the world. He must 
not assume that the world is independent of how he 
acts upon it. Indeed, in the first place—the beginning 
place, the beginning of the music, the aborning of a 
human, the inception of a design—the world and how 
we act upon it are indistinguishable. And it is only 
through the multitude of distinctions drawn that an 
apparent separate world emerges. 
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Abstract This short essay is a commentary on the 
article by Michael Lissack, and it provides a point of 
view. In this point of view it is seen that while one can 
admit that the channel capacity for human observers 
is limited, it is exactly this limitation that has led to 
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language that individuality and balance can emerge.
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